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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
In the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Egyptians nearly defeated the Israeli military 
forces in a mere five days.  The Egyptian attack was aided by over one hundred and fifty 
deception ploys in economic, political, and military form.  Beginning in February of that 
year, a small team of people commenced planning the deception campaign for an 
invasion to occur eight months later.  The actual combat that followed in October had 
been preceded by deceptive construction projects, false intelligence reports, and 
misinformation applied over a wide spectrum of noncombatant activities.   
Some individuals believe that the tremendous growth in intelligence collection 
capabilities has diminished the possibility of deceiving a sophisticated opponent.  An 
alternative perspective is that the more extensive the collection capability of an opponent, 
the greater the opportunity to feed the target specifically designed misinformation.  
Advances in information technology have created new opportunities to exploit the 
limitations on human information processing.  The United States' public and private 
computer networks are probed by rogues (i.e., illegitimate users) on a frequent basis.  
Such probing activities result in varying degrees of network infiltration.  In many cases, 
the targeted networks are compromised.  Considering the existence of such adversarial 
activity and the growing importance of network-centric warfare, questions may be asked 
such as  
• Can such adversarial network attack activities be used for our own gain?  
• Can we use our own networks and the information on these networks as a 
tool of deception?   
• Can we initiate deceptive actions within our own C4I infrastructure?   
• Can we conduct coordinated network deception operations?   
This thesis examines the potential value of network-centric strategic-level deception 
operations, which, if conducted during all phases of conflict, and in particular, during 
peacetime, would strengthen national C4I assets, support geo-political and military 
operations, and potentially deter future conflict.   
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B. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the potential value of stratagem 
conducted in the modern network-centric environment.  The proprietors of the rapidly 
growing communications infrastructures include government agencies, military 
commands, financial institutions, and corporations.  The question explored in this thesis 
is, “How do we conduct and manage network deception operations in support of the 
action of national objectives?”  The answers to the following questions provide a 
background for this explanation: 
• What is network-centric strategic-level deception (NSD)? 
• What is involved in planning and executing network deception? 
• How should the command and control structure be organized to support 
NSD? 
C. SCOPE  
The scope of this thesis includes developing a definition for network-centric 
strategic-level deception in support of national security strategies and subsequent military 
and diplomatic activities.  This thesis also introduces an organizational model for the 
planning and executing network-centric deception campaigns but detailed analysis of the 
proposed command structure is left for future work. 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF THESIS 
NSD is a sequence of computer network activities or measures taken to 
manipulate adversarial perceptions regarding computing and communication capabilities.  
Network-centric deception campaigns can facilitate strategic and operational objectives 
of the U.S. Government.  NSD is an instrument for influencing the perceptions and 
subsequent actions of adversaries with regard to economic, military, and information 
resources.  The aim of NSD is to protect the national security interests of the United 
States.  NSD enabled exploitation facilitates strategic and operational objectives by 
influencing adversarial actions and creating opportunity for tactical gain or diplomatic 
leverage. 
Second, NSD may make possible sustained network access even if adversarial 
sensors monitor network activities.  If an adversary is able to compromise a 
communications network, most likely that network becomes a liability with regard to 
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operation specific security.  Continued use of the network may not be an option.  
However, if crafted properly, an adversary would have difficulty discerning between 
legitimate and deceptive data collected from the network.  Data that is transmitted across 
the communications infrastructure by legitimate users is “accompanied by a bodyguard of 
lies”[4] via deceptive data in the “noise” of the deception.  This, in turn, can degrade the 
ability of the adversary to exploit the networks for their gain while legitimate users can 
use the infrastructure to conduct business. 
Third, NSD may mislead or persuade adversaries to opt for disadvantageous 
courses of action.  The aim of this stratagem is to guide an opponent to an unfavorable 
course of action [21] and eventually that adversary will fall victim to surprise.  Deceptive 
measures are a type of counterintelligence activity for misleading or confounding the 
adversary.  Contradictory indicators, missing data, fast moving events, time lags between 
data collection or analysis, and simple chance all inhibit accurate intelligence assessment 
and potentially lead to successful deception efforts. 
Fourth, NSD is a tool to gain operational advantage.  Historically, deception is the 
least expensive and most effective means of manipulating an opponent's military, 
economic, and diplomatic resources [14].  The objective of network deception, conducted 
at the strategic and operational levels, is to influence adversarial decision makers before 
conflict occurs.  NSD may thwart adversarial intelligence operations resulting in 
inefficient allocation of enemy assets and personnel creating diplomatic leverage and 
delaying an adversary's military or political decisions and perhaps avoiding conflict 
altogether.   
Lastly, NSD can preserve C4I assets.  Military planners, adversarial and friendly 
alike, often plan for worst-case scenarios that generally lead to inflated projections about 
the opponent's capabilities.  False projections about a nation's communication 
infrastructure and computing ability will influence an enemy's assessment of that 
opponent's command and control capability.  An adversary's inflated assessments can be 
used to the strategic advantage of the opposing side.  By forcing an adversary to allocate 
minimal intelligence assets to what is perceived to be a tertiary effort, enemy 
intelligence-gathering operations will be reduced in effectiveness.  This economy-of-
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force concept translates to communication network activities and is applicable to both 
defensive and offensive operations.  Small measures of successful network deception 
have the potential to compensate for or hide gross failures of operational security.   
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II. CASE STUDIES 
Within recent history, there have been several well-documented examples of 
meticulously planned and executed strategic-level deception campaigns that 
complimented long-term military operations.  Two famous exploits of deception were 
Plan Bodyguard during World War II and Operation Badr, which preceding the Yom 
Kippur War of 1973.  The organizations responsible for the deception efforts were the 
United Kingdom's London Control Section and the Egyptian political leadership, 
respectively. 
A. THE LONDON CONTROL SECTION 
The London Control Section (LCS) was a secret bureau established by Britain's 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill.  Considered the first national government 
organization formally tasked to conduct strategic-level deception campaigns, the LCS 
conceived and coordinated stratagems to deceive Hitler and his General Staff [4].  The 
British tool of deception was “special means,” covert activities designed to compliment 
military operations.  “Special means” was indeed Britain's strength considering the fact 
that Britain had maintained its vast empire for hundreds of years.  Deception, considered 
the pursuit of gentlemen [4], achieves great victories through “subtle means and good 
brains.”  Through the LCS, Churchill made deception an integral part of conducting 
military and statecraft affairs.  The members of the LCS used every medium of 
deception: “whispers, rumors, double and triple agents, sacrificial and clandestine 
operations” [4].  Also, Churchill made sweeping changes to Britain's intelligence 
community by centralizing the coordination of campaigns conducted by military and 
intelligence organizations.  Churchill recognized that a single repository of intelligence 
was necessary for his war of special means.  A single source of intelligence would allow 
Churchill and the LCS to possess the sum of all available intelligence in order to 
deliberate the minute details of Britain's deception campaigns. 
The Chief of the LCS was Colonel John Bevan.  Bevan was from a family of 
financiers that had connections and assets worldwide.  Deputy to Colonel Bevan was 
Colonel Sir Evelyn Leslie Wingate.  Wingate had served as a political officer throughout 
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the British Empire.  He was fluent in Greek, Arabic, French, and Urdu.  Only Colonels 
Bevan and Wingate were privy to all details of the intertwining activities of the LCS.  
Other members of the LCS came from unique and broadly varying backgrounds: 
financiers, politicians, diplomats, scientists, writers, and artists all scattered abroad and 
gentlemen of special means.  From this core of men radiated connections [4] to military 
commands and intelligence agencies, enemy and friendly alike. 
Thus, the structure of the LCS was such that a stone cast at Storey's gate 
rippled in ever widening circles of political, financial, civilian, diplomatic, 
scientific, military influence. [4] 
The LCS was not concerned with tactics or with execution of the operational 
plans.  The focus of the LCS was strategic.  The activities of the LCS transpired nowhere 
near the physical battlefields.  Their campaigns were waged via the communications 
infrastructure used by financial institutions, manufacturing facilities, diplomatic circles, 
and scientific forums.  The LCS was able to transmit instructions in a fast, secure, 
reliable, and synchronized manner.  A story planted in Lisbon circles could be 
substantiated by a political move in Washington, a news story from Stockholm, military 
action along the Syrian-Turkish border, a calculated leak at Madrid, a rumor in Cairo, and 
the statement of a high commander in New Delhi.  Through these communication 
channels, Bevan could “ring his carillon at will” [4].   
Fortitude South is perhaps the best example of the LCS ability to influence 
Germany's military operations.  The objective of Fortitude South was to mislead the 
Germans as to the time and place of an Allied invasion:  the aim was to trick the German 
leadership into believing that Allied forces would land at Pas de Calais, France.  The LCS 
already had a well-established operation known as Jael.  This particular operation 
involved spreading rumors at diplomatic posts around the world in an effort to shift 
Germany's focus anywhere other than the coast of Northwestern France.  The LCS knew 
that Germany had three primary means of intelligence collection: aerial reconnaissance, 
spies, and signals intelligence.  The LCS orchestrated the release of deception cues so 
that the pieces of the Fortitude South puzzle would create the desired perception to 
Germany's High Command.  Knowing the Luftwaffe had limited aerial reconnaissance 
capability, the LCS had to ensure what little imagery obtained by Germany would 
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support the deception storyline. The Allied deception force constructed dummy tanks, 
airfields, and landing craft that appeared authentic to airborne observers.  Next, the LCS 
turned its Double Cross (XX) Committee. The most successful double agent, Garbo, was 
able to influence German leadership from the top-down to include Adolf Hitler.  Also, an 
important factor of Fortitude South was Ultra, a code name for intelligence obtained from 
intercepts of German radio traffic.  Ultra provided timely feedback.  Through the Ultra 
radio intercepts obtained, the LCS was able to verify the varying degrees of success 
achieved by XX agents.  The content of radio intercepts supported the belief that the Pas 
de Calais was the main target of the pending Allied invasion.   
Signals deception also played a significant role in the overall plan of Fortitude 
South.  To convince the Germans that the Allies were forming an Army in Kent, radio 
message traffic was transmitted that would confirm such suspicion.  Also, the Allies used 
chaff to simulate the ships of an invasion fleet headed toward Pas de Calais.  In 
anticipation of an Allied landing, Germany's leadership positioned significant military 
forces at Pas de Calais.  Instead, Allied forces landed farther South at Normandy.  
Fortitude South proved so successful that those German forces remained at Pas de Calais 
for almost a week awaiting a landing that never happened. 
B. YOM KIPPUR WAR 
In January 1973, Egypt accelerated its preparations for a long-anticipated attack 
on Israel.  Arab leaders at the highest political levels understood that obtaining at least a 
partial surprise was essential to military success.  In order to offset Israel's overwhelming 
military superiority, Egypt and Syria initiated Operation Badr.  The Egyptian leadership 
devised a sophisticated deception plan that encompassed both political and military 
elements.  Worthy of note, Egypt's subsequent military campaign was in large measure 
built around the elaborate deception plan.  The purpose was to disguise Egypt's intentions 
by conditioning the Israelis to continuous Arab troop build-ups along the borders of the 
occupied territories.  Forcing the Israelis to operate at a high state of alert with an added 
element of uncertainty would fatigue Israeli forces.  Further, such operations conducted 
for long periods of time would place considerable financial burdens on the Israeli 
economy.  Israel could not afford to reassemble its forces every time Egypt and Syria 
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conducted defensive exercises.  Perpetual defensive exercises, President Sadat believed, 
would ultimately condition the Israelis to perceive mass movements as routine, offering 
Israel a false sense of security.   
In support of the deception plan, Egypt built defensive positions along the west 
bank of the Suez Canal.  Egypt's deception, a shrewd combination of political and 
military maneuvering, had an audience that went far beyond neighboring countries of the 
Middle East.  Arabs wanted other diplomatic powers, including the United States, to 
believe an attack from Israel was expected by Egypt.  Units conducted endless defensive 
exercises to lull the Israelis into complacency.  The Egyptians stepped-up their deception 
plan and the Israelis watched the monthly movements of men, equipment, and supplies 
progressively grow to division-size formations.  In 1973 alone, some Egyptian reserve 
units were mobilized and released as many as twenty times.  These mobilizations were 
publicized in Egyptian newspapers.  By the end of September 1973, all classes of 
reservists were activated.  Carefully emphasized in a few Egyptian newspapers was the 
announcement that reserve exercises would end by October 8th.  However, unlike 
previous exercises, civil defense organizations were not activated.  In September alone, 
the Egyptian formations moved up to the canal six times and then withdrew. Egyptian 
planners were confident that Israel was now interpreting large force movement as routine.   
Another facet of the deception plan called for Egypt to depict its military as 
operationally unready.  The Egyptian Navy made arrangements for submarines to receive 
repairs in Pakistan.  Months earlier, Sadat had dismissed thousands of Soviet military 
advisors who were providing training to the Egyptian forces. The Israeli leadership 
believed that Egypt could not operate newly acquired weapons without proper training.  
Further, the Egyptian government made public announcements that its Naval forces had 
performed poorly during exercises and would need to undergo further training.  
Consequently, Israeli intelligence estimations were that Egypt could not launch attacks 
until 1975.  The Egyptian leadership shrewdly utilized the media in the days immediately 
prior to October 7th.  For example, an announcement was printed that officers could 
request to make the Oomrah to Mecca.  Also, several Egyptian news sources publicized 
that two thousand reservists were to be demobilized on October 3rd, just four days before 
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the pending attack.  To avoid any tone of imminence, diplomatic elements of the 
deception plan were carefully orchestrated by President Sadat, himself.  In February 
1973, Sadat dispatched his national security advisor to numerous foreign capitals 
including Moscow, Bonn, London, and Washington.  He also sent Egypt's foreign 
minister to New Delhi and Peking to lobby support for Sadat's peace plan.  Sadat's bogus 
pursuit of peace failed but the political impression was that Sadat wanted a peaceful 
solution to Egypt's conflict with Israel.  In the days immediately before the war, 
continuing diplomatic squabbling between Egypt and Libya was perceived to be business 
as usual.  Also, Egypt continued preparations for a pending visit from Princess Margaret 
and visits from Romanian dignitaries were conducted as scheduled.  On October 5th, 
several of Sadat's ministers were on diplomatic missions abroad offering no indication of 
attack.  Israel's, as well as the United States', perception was that of Egypt conducting 
only defensive maneuvers and that Syria was fortifying defenses.  The Arab deception 
plan was so successful, that as late as the morning of October 5, 1973, Israeli intelligence 
advisors briefed Prime Minister Golda Meir that the risk of an attack was low.  On 
October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria opened a coordinated surprise attack against Israel. 
C. DISCUSSION 
The deception campaigns of Plan Bodyguard and Operation Badr clearly illustrate 
many important details involved in a deception campaign.  First, the critical activities of a 
deception campaign can be far removed from the physical battlefield..  Both Sadat and 
Churchill understood that diplomacy, economics, and information are essential tools of 
deception.  Second, these deception campaigns were driven by leadership involvement at 
the highest levels.  In each of the aforementioned case studies, the top leaders from each 
nation had directly participated in their deception campaigns.  Third, in both instances, 
military operations were tailored around the greater deception campaign plan.  Finally, 
secrecy was paramount for both deception campaigns.  The existence of LCS was more 
guarded than the U.S. project to develop the atomic bomb.  In fact, the details of the LCS 
were not revealed until almost thirty years after WWII.  The Egyptian leadership was so 
successful with their operational security (OPSEC) efforts that an overwhelming 
percentage of Egyptian and Syrian soldiers did not know of the offensive until hostilities 
commenced.  Israel conducted interrogation of over 8,000 Egyptian and Syrian POW's. 
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Ninety-five percent of the captives learned of the attack only on the first day of the war.  
Of Egypt's eighteen captured lieutenant colonels and colonels, only four knew on October 
4th that war would break out, but these POWs did not know when. One colonel learned 
the specifics on October 5th.  The remaining thirteen high-ranking officers were informed 
the morning of the operations.  During all phases of war, to include peace, deception 
should be the most secret of secret operations. [21] 
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III. PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF DECEPTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
A network-centric strategic-level deception (NSD) campaign can be described as 
a coordinated wrapping of many small, elements of misinformation and deceptive actions 
within a scheme across multiple computer networks.  In other words, many deceptive 
operations constitute a network deception campaign.  Network deception can be 
compared to that of a theatrical production.  Fundamental elements of theater include 
such things as dialogue, characters, scenery, and props [8]. Similarly, a detailed script for 
Network Deception would include elements of users, computers, intranets, organizations, 
and most importantly, information.  These elements alone have little meaning.  However, 
if combined in a complimentary manner, a coherent storyline can be conveyed. 
1. What is Network-Centric Strategic-Level Deception? 
This thesis defines network-centric strategic-level deception as a sequence of 
computer network activities or actions taken to manipulate adversarial perceptions 
regarding computing and communication capabilities.  NSD may serve multiple 
purposes.  One possible purpose is employing coordinated NSD to compliment the 
conventional elements of a broad deception.  In other words, a network deception 
campaign may be a component of a more comprehensive and multifaceted strategic 
campaign that includes complimentary diplomatic, economic, and military elements 
spanning organizational boundaries (e.g., across military units, government agencies, and 
even nation-states).  The activities associated with this particular type of network 
deception include masking the extent and disposition of network activities, fabricating 
mock data networks, and creating the impression of authentic information with associated 
processes where none will actually occur.  A second possible type of network deception, 
which this thesis will not address, is to provide a layer of protection to information within 
networks.  This purpose of this type of network deception activity is to conceal the intent 
to conceal or shroud the information on a network or perhaps even cloak the true purpose 
for which that network is used. 
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Practically all ruses and stratagems of war “are variations or developments of a 
few simple tricks that have been practiced by man on man since man was hunted by 
man.” [21] Techniques of deception come in many forms to include ruses, decoys, 
camouflage, and feints.  These deception concepts may be employed within 
communication networks in order to deceive or condition a target's perception about the 
intent or purpose of communication activities.  We have termed deception concepts that 
are specific to network operations as deceptors.  Specific network activities intended to 
manipulate adversarial perceptions and influence actions are called deceptors.  The term 
“deceptor” is applicable to deceptive data, network components, or possibly an entire 
network. 
 
Table 1. Deception Techniques and Deceptors 
Deception Technique Battlespace Deception Deceptor 
Camouflage & Concealment Use of terrain and environment features in an effort 
to hide, blend, or disguise tactical assets and 
personnel. 
Cloaked information, communication 
assets, or networks that are undetectable 
or indistinguishable from adjacent 
superficial networks.  
Demonstrations, Feints, or 
Diversions 
Exhibition of military force intended to delude the 
enemy to an unfavorable course of action. 
A network action intended to distract or 
draw adversarial attention away from an 
intended target of information.   
Displays, Decoys, or 
Dummy 
Authentic or imitation tactical assets and personnel 
statically displayed to enemy intelligence sensors. 
Fictitious network or sub-components 
serving as a static front or cover 
purposely exposed to observation.  
Mimic, Simulations, Spoofs Tactical systems and assets that do not exist are 
projected onto the battlefield for enemy observation. 
A network activity conducted to assume 
resemblance of a trusted relationship in 
order to either protect or exploit 
information, computers, or networks. 
Dazzle or Sensor Saturation Screening activity that causes temporary loss of 
visual or sensor surveillance degrading enemy 
targeting ability. 
Screening action that disrupts sensor 
acuity, temporarily degrading an 
opponent's intelligence collection ability. 
Disinformation or Ruses Tactical action involving fraudulent information or 
maneuvers intended to deceive adversarial 
intelligence collection and leadership. 
Fraudulent network assets or information 
purposely exposed to adversarial sensors 
in order to exploit or gain advantage. 
Conditioning Tactical actions that generate and subsequently 
exploit a target's preexisting bias, belief, or habit.   
Network operations or communication 
activities intended to establish, reaffirm, 
and exploit adversarial bias and beliefs. 
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A communication channel that broadcasts relevant and authentic data can also transmit 
irrelevant and false data.  Network-centric deception supports any operation, which has 
objectives that are a function of communication networks, both adversarial and friendly.  
In other words, if an adversary relies on communication networks to obtain, process, and 
analyze the common operational picture (COP), that COP may be skewed or altered 
through NSD.  
In conventional warfare, successful deception operations evolve in three distinct 
phases: 1) manipulate beliefs, 2) affect action based on altered perceptions, and 3) exploit 
and benefit from subsequent actions.  NSD has a useful role in this three-phase process.  
Within the first phase, it can be conducted to either generate or reaffirm an enemy's 
preexisting bias and beliefs.  Affecting an adversary's belief system is a process that may 
take considerable time.  In this thesis, altering a target's beliefs and perception is 
considered a strategic activity.  The second phase of the deception process is to 
precipitate adversarial action.  Conducting NSD to facilitate action by an opponent 
should be executed within specific operations, and thus, contemplated at the operational 
level of conflict.  The third phase of deception in warfare is the exploitation of adversarial 
action for the purpose of gain.  The third phase, exploiting an opponent's action for gain, 
is conducted at the tactical level.  This thesis will not address exploitation for gain 
because this phase is removed from the information domain.  However, tactical aspects 
must be noted when discussing conflict because operational victory is a product of 
tactical successes.   
 
Figure 1.   Network Deception Process and Levels of Conflict 
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2. Strategic and Operational-Level Network-Centric Deception 
NSD is of value if a country makes use of computing and communication 
networks to facilitate its long-term military and geo-political goals.  In order for a 
network deception campaign to be developed and initiated, operational if not strategic 
objectives must exist to provide the context for that deception.  Strategically, successful 
network deception results from an array of deceptors designed to influence adversarial 
perceptions of friendly capabilities and intentions in such a manner as to support already-
established strategic objectives.   
 
Figure 2.   Deception Process and OODA Loop 
 
Historically, attempts at strategic deceptions have relied on circumstances that are 
difficult if not unlikely to anticipate. [19]  In other words, there is a significant amount of 
luck required for strategic deception to be successfully executed.  Operation Mincemeat 
of World War II, perhaps the most famous deception operation ever mounted in warfare, 
also documented in the book and movie “The Man that Never Was”, highlights the 
critical role chance plays in strategic deception.  Operation Mincemeat involved British 
intelligence using a human corpse as a means to convince Hitler and his High Command 
that the objective of a pending Allied invasion of southern Europe was to land in 
Sardinia.  In actuality, the Allies had selected Sicily as the real target.  British intelligence 
went to great efforts to prepare and plant the corpse.  “Major Martin” the corpse, was a 
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junior staff officer, supposedly killed in a plane crash on his way to Allied HQ in North 
Africa.  The deception planning was so complete in detail that British intelligence 
officers created a personality for “Martin,” planting on the body letters from a fictional 
girlfriend, theatre tickets, and even a memo from his bank manager.  Also, attached to the 
corpse were cleverly forged documents designed to convince Germany's military 
intelligence that plans for an attack on Sicily were decoys from the real target.  The 
corpse of “Martin” was set adrift by a submarine off the Spanish coast.  Once Major 
Martin was set adrift, the British could only hope the body would wash ashore and be 
recovered by Nazi authorities.  Fortunately, luck was on the side of the Allies.  Major 
Martin's body washed up on a Spanish shore and was intercepted by Nazi intelligence 
services.  From a historical perspective, repeated instances of plain luck, necessary for 
successful strategic deception, is rare.  Regardless, this thesis will discuss NSD at the 
strategic as well as operational levels of conflict.   
B. REQUIREMENTS FOR NSD 
1. Central Organization and Control 
In order for the storyline of a NSD campaign to unfold in its intended manner, the 
command of coordination, timing, and tempo must be focused at the strategic level. 
However, command and control of a deception may shift to the operational level during 
conflict.  A NSD campaign will involve various organizations with multiple systems 
across numerous networks.  If a deceptor is applied at one node of the network, the other 
deceptors need to be formulated and positioned to make the first deceptor seem plausible.  
Centralized management is necessary to maintain a plausible degree of continuity and 
avoid conflicting details within the storyline.  Also, centralized management is necessary 
for the operational security of the entire campaign.  In order to maintain the integrity of 
the network deception campaign, the number of people involved in planning needs be 
kept to an absolute minimum.  Maintaining a balance of effective management and 
campaign secrecy is best accomplished by centralized organization and control.  
2. Planning, Preparation, and Timing 
As in the stage production analogy previously described, in order for the story to 
unfold in the desired manner, each element of the NSD campaign must be coordinated 
with the proper timing of signals [10] and tempo of content.  All of these elements play to 
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the perceptions of the target or adversarial decision maker.  Formulating a deception 
campaign must begin in the initial planning phase of the core strategy for which the long-
term deception campaign is intended to support.  Also, the deception must be acutely 
integrated into core communication network operations.  Successful and authentic 
network activities are creativity, imaginative, unusual, and believed to be impossible by 
an adversary.  However, the storyline that the deception conveys must be sensible and 
obvious to its intended target.  In other words, friendly network operations to be viewed 
by the enemy must be plausible and appear authentic.  In order to understand what an 
enemy may or may not consider authentic, the elements of the target's decision and 
intelligence cycle must be understood.  Further, the deception storyline should be 
doctrinally consistent with known friendly capabilities.  Planning and preparation issues 
to remain cognizant of when planning a network deception campaign include but are not 
limited to: 
• Accessibility of network to the adversary 
• Network resources relied upon by the adversary intelligence gathering 
organizations 
• Deceptors needed to provide confirmation to the adversary 
Lastly, timing of signals and tempo of content of the deception storyline is critical to a 
successful campaign.  Proper sequencing planted signals with necessary content provides 
a degree of plausibility to the story being conveyed. 
3. Credibility, Confirmation, and Flexibility 
Long-term NSD operations must involve three key aspects: credibility, 
confirmation, and flexibility.  Credibility preys upon the target's belief base.  Non-
deceptive network activities aside, the NSD must be straightforward, sensible and 
obvious in order not to be ignored by the adversary.  Network deception should be rooted 
in truth and play on the expectations of the adversary by reinforcing what the enemy 
already believes.  Initial credibility will draw the necessary attention of the adversary.  
Once indicators are interpreted to be credible, providing confirmation is the next 
consideration for the deception campaign.  Again, this intermediate step of providing 
confirmation to the adversary will lead to the opponent taking action--the final step in the 
deception process.  Confirmation lends itself to manipulating the target's actions.  The 
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third and final step of a deception campaign is to gain advantage from the adversarial 
actions.  Therefore, a deception plan must allow for some degree of freedom with regard 
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IV. NETWORK-CENTRIC STRATEGIC DECEPTION MODEL 
A. NETWORK DECEPTION STRATEGIC DECEPTION MANAGEMENT 
MODEL 
The NSD Management Model described in this chapter is a framework for 
organizations cooperating to conduct strategic-level deception and exchange information 
in a manner comparable to a flattened network.  In other words, the suggested model 
provides a process for a labyrinth of public and private organizations to disseminate 
information in a timely manner, bypassing bureaucratic obstacles and circumventing 
organizational hindrances.  The NSD Management Model shown below encompasses the 
hierarchy of government organizations to include the National Security Council, the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, numerous Combat Support 
Agencies, and elements of the Global Information Infrastructure.  
Many of the elements that fall within this hierarchal pyramid have already 
established formal relationships and doctrine.  A new concept introduced by this model is 
the network deception-planning cell.  The deception cell added to the existing 
bureaucratic structure creates a viable scheme for managing network deception in the 
































Figure 3.   NSD Management Model 
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1. National Security Council 
The National Security Council (NSC) is a small assembly, chaired by the 
President, which contemplates national security issues, sets foreign policy, and develops 
geo-political objectives that support national security.  The NSC also serves as the 
President's primary instrument for coordinating policies among various government 
agencies.  With respect to the NSD management model, the NSC is a critical tool from 
which the President and the deception coordinator have direct influence to not only 
military affairs, but more importantly, complimentary diplomatic and economic resources 
which are necessary to complete the deception picture.  Permanent members of the NSC 
include the following: 
• The President 
• The Vice President 
• Secretary of State 
• Secretary of Defense 
• Secretary of the Treasury 
• Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
• National Security Advisor 
• Director of the Central Intelligence 
• Chief of Staff to the President 
• Assistant to the President for the Economic Policy 
The heads of other executive departments and agencies, as well as other senior officials, 
attend meetings of the NSC as needed.  An important document developed by the NSC is 
the National Security Strategy (NSS).  The NSS is the text that outlines the long-term 
objectives that best serves the interests of the United States.  Once complete, the NSS is 
then passed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JSC).  The JCS draws on the NSS as the primary 
guide to develop the National Military Strategy (NMS). 
2. Joint Chiefs of Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense 
The JCS includes the Chairman, Vice Chairman, Chiefs of the four armed 
services, and the Joint Chiefs Directorates, J1-J8.  These specific directorates are: 
• J1: Manpower and Personnel 
• J2: Intelligence 
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• J3: Operations 
• J4: Logistics 
• J5: Strategic Plans 
• J6: C4I 
• J7: Operational Planning 
• J8: Force Structure 
The primary function of the JCS is to develop the NMS as directed by the 
President and the Secretary of Defense.  Developed from the NSS and its objectives, the 
NMS supports the policies and directives of the NSC from a strategic outlook, which is 
doctrinally five to seven years.  Also involved in the development and execution of the 
NMS is the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).  The OSD is the principle staff 
element of the Secretary of Defense responsible for policy development, resource and 
fiscal management, to include program evaluation.  Within the proposed NSD 
management model, the OSD and JCS are critical yet unsuspecting participants oblivious 
to any deception campaigns.  The OSD and JCS directorates are able to arrange and 
project deception storyline indicators that are associated with the military industrial 
complex.  
3. Combat Support Agencies 
The Combat Support Agencies are agencies that serve the NSD management 
model in either of two capacities.  The first purpose of the CSAs is projecting pieces of 
specifically tailored information.  This information may be in the form of human, signal, 
technical, or possibly optical intelligence.  The second capacity of the CSAs is to provide 
a means of feedback for a deception operation.  Again, this feedback may be in the form 
of human, signal, technical, and optical intelligence.    
a. Defense Intelligence Agency 
The DIA is a major producer of foreign military intelligence.  The DIA 
provides military intelligence to warfighters, defense policy makers, and force planners, 
in the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community, in support of U.S. 
military planning and operations and weapon systems acquisition.  Also, the DIA 
coordinates activities of the defense intelligence community.  The DIA is versed in the 
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areas of military history and doctrine, economics, physics, chemistry, world history, 
political science, bio-sciences, and computer sciences.  
b. Defense Information System Agency 
The DISA is a combat-support agency responsible for planning, 
engineering, acquiring, fielding, and supporting the Defense Information System 
Network that serves the needs of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the other 
DoD Components.  
c. Defense Logistics Agency 
The DLA Director reports to the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics through the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 
(Logistics and Materiel Readiness). DLA provides worldwide logistics support for the 
missions of the Military Departments and the Unified Combatant Commands.  The DLA 
also provides logistics support to other DoD Components and certain Federal agencies, 
foreign governments, international organizations, and others as authorized. 
d. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 
Formed from several different defense and intelligence agencies, the NGA 
merges imagery, maps, charts, and environmental data into geospatial intelligence.  Using 
the latest technology, the NGA renders imagery and geospatial data into visual 
representations.  This capability aids in multiple applications for homeland defense and 
national security, serving military, civil, and international needs. 
e. National Security Agency 
NSA has two primary missions.  First, its information assurance mission 
provides the solutions, products, and services needed to achieve information assurance 
for information infrastructures critical to national security.  Second, the foreign signals 
intelligence (SIGINT) mission allows for effective organization and control of all the 
foreign signals collection and processing activities of the United States. NSA is 
authorized to produce SIGINT in accordance with objectives, requirements, and priorities 




4. Global Information Infrastructure 
The Global Information Infrastructure (GII) is the transnational communications 
system that facilitates communication across the entire globe including 
telecommunications and computer networks.  The physical links of the GII are 
transoceanic cables, terrestrial communications systems, and layered satellite 
constellations.  The GII is dynamic and constantly evolving characterized by private and 
public ownership as well as private and public users. 
In contrast, a National Information Infrastructures (NII) is composed of 
communication networks that fall within the influence and control of a nation state.  
Multiple NIIs constitute the greater GII.  The numerous elements of a nation's 
communication infrastructure include public, private, and corporate communication 
networks used to regulate:   
• Finance - Banking, payment services, investment institutions, securities 
and commodities exchanges, transaction networks, and record storage.   
• Energy - Power production, distribution, storage, efficient management, 
and grid status. Worthy of note, the NII is dependent on the national 
power infrastructure, and likewise, the electrical grid is regulated through 
the NII.  
• Chemical - Production and distribution for transportation and 
manufacturing needs. 
• Transportation - Physical distribution surface shipping, rail systems, and 
air traffic. 
• Government Services - Critical services at all levels of government to 
include public health, emergency response, social security payments, and 
record storage.  
These various networks within the NII serve completely different purposes but are all 
dependent on efficient and timely communication.   
The Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) is the infrastructure utilized by the 
military and intelligence organizations of the nation.  The United States DII is maintained 
by DISA.  The DII is an information grid of networks, computers, databases, weapon 
interfaces, and security systems that process and transport the information needed by the 
DoD.  The DII can be divided into three subgroups: Program and Technical Activities, 
C4I, and DII applications.  These elements are becoming increasingly integrated into the 
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NII and GII via commercial services.  As networked digital systems become ubiquitous, 
it is ever more difficult to differentiate between public, private, and military networks.  
These networks use the same physical infrastructure.  
B. THE DECEPTION CELL 
In our model of the command structure, the network deception cell is a select 
collective of leaders who are tasked with the development, planning, coordination, and 
execution of network deception campaigns.  Numbering less than one dozen permanent 
members, the deception cell is comprised of leaders of public corporations, private 
organizations, government agencies, military commands, financial institutions, and 
academic institutions.  These cell members have direct influence over the various 
elements that comprise the NII, if not the GII.  The premise of the deception cell is to 
flatten or horizontally integrate the large and complex hierarchy of organizations that 
comprise the NII.  The most critical undertakings of a network-deception campaign are 
the selection of a deception cell leader, the selection of the deception cell members, and 
the subsequent coordination or organization of these cell members.   
1. Coordinating Officer 
The coordinating officer leads the deception cell.  Acting as the manager of the 
deception cell, the coordinating officer supervises the execution of network deception 
activities by the cell members and their respective establishments.  Additionally, the 
coordinating officer works in conjunction with the Joint Planning Staff and briefs the 
NSC when required.  In working with the JCS, the coordinating officer ensures that cover 
plans prepared by the JCS and NSC compliment strategic, as well as operational plans 
and activities.  Further, this individual has direct access to all members of the NSC, to 
include the President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense.  When deemed 
necessary, the coordinating officer may exercise the authority of the President and the 
Secretary of Defense. This measure is necessary to resolve or subvert bureaucratic 
conflicts. Also, the coordinating officer is to direct the establishment of working relations 
with the leadership of public and private organizations that may not be organic to the 
deception cell.  Other details of the coordinating officer's job description include the  
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support of network deception schemes by information leakage and the perpetuation of 
network propaganda.  Also, the coordinating officer will oversee the selection and 
departure of cell members.  
2. Cell Members 
These members, permanent as well as temporary, are drawn from the various 
sectors that rely on the NII.  These sectors include but are not limited to: 
• Banking and Finance 
• Transportation  
• Manufacturing 
• Telecommunications  
• Government agencies  
• Military  
• Civil infrastructure 
• Academia 
This group must be kept small and organized in a manner that facilitates communication 
and promotes creativity among the members and their respective organizations. 
3. Cell Organization 
Equally important is the assembly of the cell members.  With respect to time and 
information, the national and global information infrastructures are dynamic, if not 
volatile environments.  The cell members must be able to organize in a manner that is 
conducive to creativity, communication, and coordination.  However, network-centric 
deception campaigns hinge on a paradoxical relationship of intelligence sharing and 
operations security.  The organization of the network deception cell must be structured in 
a manner that considers these three pillars of a successful deception campaign.  
Intelligence assessments establish a starting point to incorporate strategic-level network 
deception measures into normal network operations.  Efficient communication among 
cell members is an absolute necessity to maintain proper content and timing among the 
numerous elements of a strategic deception campaign.  The second important 
consideration when organizing the deception cell is full integration and synchronization 
into the planning and execution phases of an operation.  Synchronization entails 
obtaining, interpreting, and disseminating intelligence to the planners [9] of the deception 
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and operational campaigns to coordinate deception related activities.  The activities 
between the intelligence organizations and operational planners must be conducted in a 
complementary and synchronized manner:  This is the purpose of the deception cell.  
Perhaps the most important element of a network deception campaign is that of 
operational security.  Operational security is essential to the successes of the deception as 
it establishes the base of secrecy necessary for success.  Strong operational security, 
however, not only shrouds the deception operation but also protects the integrity of the 
true operation.  
The structure of the deception cell must be elastic enough to plan and execute 
deceptions in a volatile environment.  The coordination officer must be given the ability 
to alter the framework in which the members are allowed to interact.  There are three 
possible organizational structures; open forum, compartmental, and hybrid.  An open 
forum has no formal order.  Such a structure would facilitate communication and 
creativity among the cell members.  The flexibility of altering campaign plans and 
coordination would also be advanced by an open forum.  However, the premise of an 
open forum runs counter to operational security.  Less favorable to communication and 
synergy is compartmentalization of the deception cell.  The primary advantage of 
compartmentalization is that such a structure would limit damage in the case that the 
integrity of the deception cell is compromised.  The third possible organization structure 
is a hybrid of open forum and compartmentalization.  This combination could be of any 
varying degree that is a function of the need for communication among specific members, 
while maintaining an appropriate level of secrecy about operations. 
C. MODEL VALIDATION 
China's ability to detonate a nuclear device at high altitude is a clear threat to U.S. 
military forces.  Such use of a nuclear device would produce an electromagnetic pulse 
(EMP) that would seriously disrupt and degrade the command and control capabilities of 
any U.S. military forces within distances as great as one thousand miles.  Understanding 
this very real threat that China poses, the U.S. could initiate a deception campaign 
intended to convince China, as well as other adversaries, that the United States has  
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successfully developed and tested integrated circuitry technology that demonstrates 
resistance to EMP pulses with intensity comparable to close proximity nuclear 
detonations.   
Considering China is an adversary with highly sophisticated communications 
capabilities and systematic intelligence collection, its leadership is an excellent candidate 
for a strategic-level deception campaign.  In this particular deception campaign, specific 
networks within the U.S. NII will serve as the primary instrument of deception.  The 
objective of this deception campaign is to deter any future military confrontation with 
China.  The target is the Chinese military and civilian leadership at the highest levels.  
The story line is that the United States has developed integrated circuit technology that is 
completely impervious to high intensity EMP discharges.  Further, the U.S. Government 
has completed extensive field testing and this new circuitry technology allows electrical 
components such as tactical communication and data equipment to be exposed to an 
intense EMP such as that of a nuclear blast and remain operational.  The primary 
consequence of this revolutionary technological is that the U.S. military command and 
control infrastructure is no longer vulnerable EMP associated with directed energy 
weapons and high-altitude nuclear detonations. 
To the best of our knowledge, this technology may not exist.  However, key 
indicators associated with development, fabrication, and fielding of this EMP-resistant 
technology could be placed throughout cyberspace.  By implementing concepts of NSD 
on the U.S. NII, an adversary such as China might be shown the way to conclude that 
EMP/HEMP weapons will not be effective against critical U.S. communications assets.  
If such a technology were developed, a broad range of organizations to include DoD, 
academic, financial, government, and commercial corporations would have direct 
involvement in the development, testing, and subsequent fielding.  To convince the 




Figure 4.   NSD Model Illustration 
 
Coordinating an intricate computer-based deception among academic institutions, 
research facilities, military commands, government offices, and commercial business 
would present geographic, technological, and bureaucratic barriers.  To provide a 
plausible story that numerous organizations contributed to the development and 
production of EMP resistant electrical components, many communication networks will 
need specific deceptors put in place.  In order to convey a convincing story, these 
deceptors compliment one another with respect to content and timing. 
As suggested by the model, personal relationships existing within the network 
deception cell would be the most expeditious and secure way to facilitate placement of 
deceptors within applicable networks.  The members of the network deception cell would 
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example, DoD networks would need to indicate that programs for EMP-resistant circuitry 
were being sponsored by DoD.  These programs would require financial support.  
Financial transactions would need to be conducted to validate the existence of EMP-
resistant product development.  Further, if such product development were conducted, 
universities, national laboratories, and manufactures would produce significant amounts 
of data concerning product research and development.  The cell members, having direct 
influence over particular military, financial, academic, and commercial communication 
networks have the task of putting deceptors into operation.  The coordinating officer, who 
has direct oversight over network deception cell activities, would serve as the liaison 
between network-cell activities and governmental organizations such as the NSC and 
JCS.  The coordinating officer would ensure that the cell's NSD activities remain 
consistent and in support of national strategic and operational objectives and also 
compliment deception activities that may involve diplomatic and military efforts.   
D. DISCUSSION 
The model described in this chapter suggests a general framework for planning 
and executing network-centric deception actions within complex hierarchies of 
organizations.  This model offers several advantages.  First, this framework provides for a 
small number of key personnel a means for integrating and synchronizing the tangle of 
public and government organizations that constitute the NII.  Without restructuring or 
augmenting existing government agencies, strategic and operational level network 
deception can be planned, coordinated, and executed with the involvement of national 
leadership at the highest levels.  Also of importance, this model integrates all elements of 
statecraft: military force, economics, diplomacy, and information.  Horizontal integration 
is necessary to minimize the broad range of barriers and subsequent friction associated 
with multi-organizational interaction.  These barriers may be technical, monetary, 
geographic, cultural, lingual, and legal.  Legal issues are outside the scope of this thesis.  
Moreover, the network-centric deception model allows for operational flexibility.  The 
deception cell, members as well as organizational structure, may need to change as 
strategic and operational circumstances dictate.  Flexibility with regard to cell 
organization becomes more important as a campaign progresses through developmental, 
planning, and execution phases.  Specific details such as interaction and communication 
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among cell members must be left to the discretion of the deception cell.  In particular, this 
model allows the cell leadership to have direct control of cell members, cell structure, 
campaign scope and direction.  Lastly, since this model is centered on a small cadre, there 
is an inherent element of operational security.  To summarize, network-centric strategic-
level deception campaign is characterized by organizations targeting other organizations 




Growth in global communications and the subsequent reliance on information 
technology has created new opportunities for strategic and operational-level deception 
campaigns.  Offered in this thesis is the concept of planning and executing strategic-level 
deceptions among multiple global communication networks.  This concept is known as 
network-centric strategic-level deception (NSD).  NSD is a succession of computer 
network measures conducted to manipulate perceptions held by adversaries in support of 
complex strategic or operational deception campaigns that incorporate diplomatic, 
economic, and military elements.  Specific network activities intended to manipulate 
adversarial perceptions and influence actions are called deceptors.   
Historical accounts of deception discussed in this thesis emphasized four 
fundamental aspects necessary for a successful deception campaign.  First, deception 
operations cannot be considered a responsibility of the military leadership.  Successful 
strategic-level deception involves economic, diplomatic, and information activities much 
more so than military actions.  Second, deception campaigns require aggressive 
involvement of a nation's highest leadership.  Next, to achieve success, military 
operations must be planned and executed around information campaigns to include 
deception.  Fourth, secrecy is the utmost priority in all campaign planning activities.  
Deception operations as well as other operations depend on maintaining operational 
security to the highest degree. 
NSD serves a process that has three distinct phases.  These three phases involve 
manipulating adversarial perceptions, precipitating action, and eventual exploitation of 
resultant action.  NSD offers a means to manipulate perception and affect action.  Also, 
this NSD process must be centrally organized and completely synchronized with primary 
operations beginning at the earliest phase.  The proposed NSD command structure in this 
thesis is a framework that facilitates a process for public and private organizations to 
conduct coordinated deceptive network activities in a timely manner, circumventing 
bureaucratic conflict.  The network deception model offered for planning and executing 
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NSD incorporates centralized control, broad integration (of the complex elements of 
information infrastructures), and operational secrecy.   
B. FUTURE WORK 
The concept of network-centric strategic-level deception offers many avenues for 
research.  For example, implementing deception techniques and deceptors specific to 
communication networks, such as a feint or decoy networks, remains to be explored. The 
specific attributes of the deceptor concept needs to be further detailed.  Another possible 
area of research is the development of an authoritative structure for coordinating NSD 
activities among civilian communication networks under the control of public and private 
organizations.  Also, another research area involves extending the NSD model to the 
participation of allied nations in U.S. led deception campaigns and incorporating methods 
of influence and network exploitation on the GII not controlled by the United States.  The 
President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) has established 
partnerships among public, private, and governmental sectors, such as the Information 
Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC) and Cross-Sector Partnerships (CSPs).  Something 
similar might be done for NSD but it is remains to be determined how to create ISAC or 
CSP-like groups in which secrecy can be maintained.  It is necessary to develop further 
the theory underlying the NSD management model, from the perspective of 
organizational design.  A starting point would be to build on the theories about levels and 
span of control described in [5].  Lastly, an area of future work is the incorporation NSD 
into the Department of Defense's vision for a Global Information Grid (GIG).  In order to 
facilitate information superiority worldwide, the GIG concept encompasses 
communication systems both owned by the U.S. Government and leased from corporate 
entities.  NSD could be used in a complimentary manner with the GIG to provide not 
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